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Commeni: Jury Trial in Minnesota-Right or
Obligation?
Defendant, a black adult male, confessed to killing a white
teenaged girl' and was charged with first degree murder.2 Be-
fore trial, defense counsel, alleging that prejudicial pretrial pub-
licity and community racial bias precluded a fair jury trial for
defendant in the overwhelmingly white county of venue, moved
for a waiver of jury trial or, in the alternative, a change of
venue.3 The motions were denied and defendant was convicted of
murder in the first degree. On appeal from the denial of
waiver,4 the Supreme Court of Minnesota, with three of its nine
justices not participating, affirmed, holding that MINNESOTA
STATUTES § 631.015 does not grant defendants an absolute right
to waive jury trial and that the trial court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in denying the motion. Two justices dissented from
the latter holding, and their views were adopted by a third, al-
though he concurred in the decision.( State v. Kilburn, 231
N.W.2d 61 (Minn. 1975).
1. After an abortive sexual encounter, defendant, fearing allega-
tions of rape, became enraged and struck the victim with a tire jack
2. Despite defendant's confession, the case proceeded to trial on
the question whether defendant had the requisite intent for murder in
the first degree.
3. Defendant expressly consented to the motion. See Brief for Ap-
pellant at 12, State v. Kilburn, 231 N.W.2d 61 (Mlinn. 1975).
4. The denial of the motion for a change of venue was not ap-
pealed.
5. MANsOTA STATUTES § 631.01 provided in pertinent part:
Except where defendant waives a jury trial, every issue of fact
shall be tried by a jury of the county in which the indictment
was found or information filed . . . . If the defendant shall
waive a jury trial, such waiver shall be in writing signed by
him in open court after he has been arraigned and has had op-
portunity to consult with counsel and shall be filed with the
clerk. Such waiver may be withdrawn by the defendant at any
time before the commencement of the trial.
6. 231 N.W.2d 61, 67 (Otis, J., dissenting); id. at 71 (Rogosheske,
J., dissenting). The views of the dissenters "as to the general principles
of law involved" were shared by Justice MacLaughlin. Id. at 66 (concur-
ring opinion). He concurred in the result only on the ground that "it
appears from the record and the statement made by the trial attorney
for defendant that defendant received a fair trial; there was little preju-
dicial pretrial publicity shown; and it appears that the result was just."
Id. Thus, since three of the court's nine justices did not participate, the
court was split 3-3 on the questions of law that are the subject of this
Comment, and it is just as likely that future decisions will reflect the
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Although Kilburn raised the waiver issue under section
631.01, the opposing opinions of the justices on the issue of the
trial court's discretion to deny a motion for waiver foreshadow
a similar split concerning the proper construction of the waiver
provisions of rule 26 of the new Minnesota Rules of Criminal
Procedure,7 which became effective shortly after the Kilburn de-
cision. Inasmuch as each of the opposing viewpoints in Kilburn
was adopted by three justices, it remains an open question as
to which view will prevail when the whole court faces the issue
under the new rule. This implication of the case can best be
examined, however, after a discussion of the court's treatment
of section 631.01.
Kilburn is the first Minnesota case to hold that section
631.01 does not create an absolute right to waiver of a jury trial,
but the unanimous decision on that point came as no surprise.
Four years earlier, in Gaulke v. State,8 the court had reached
the same conclusion in extended dictum. In that case it held
that defendant's claim of a right to waiver based on section
631.01 could not be asserted by petition for post-conviction relief;
but the court went on to offer "an expression of [its] views
concerning waiver of a jury trial in criminal cases ... [for
the] assistance [of] the bench and bar."9  Those views were:
(1) In light of antecedent case law 0 section 631.01 could be
presumed not to have been intended to create an absolute right to
waiver." (2) The fate of a motion for waiver should depend, as
dissenters' point of view as that they will reflect the position espoused
in the opinion for the court. For the sake of convenience, however, the
latter position will be referred to herein as that of the court in Kilburn,
or of the Kilburn case.
7. MAnNESOTA STATUTES § 631.01 was superceded by rule 26. See
In re Proposed Rules of Criminal Procedure, Order of the Supreme Court
of Minnesota, 299 Minn. (unnumbered page) (1974).
8. 289 Minn. 354, 184 N.W.2d 599 (1.971).
9. Id. at 359, 184 N.W.2d at 602.
10. Case law allowed an accused to waive jury trial only "within
such time limits as the trial court, exercising a sound discretion in behalf
of those before it, may permit." Id. (quoting State v. Sackett, 39 Minn.
69, 72, 38 N.W. 773, 775 (1888)).
11. The court also mentioned the "historical antecedents of our
[state] constitution" as a reason for doubting that section 631.01 was in-
tended to create an absolute right to waiver, but it did not elaborate
on this point. Id. The conclusion that section 631.01 does not create an
absolute right to waiver assumes, of course, that the Minnesota Constitu-
tion does not grant such a right. Article 1, section 4 of the latter pro-
vides:
The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall ex-
tend to all cases at law without regard to the amount in contro-
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it did before enactment of section 631.01, on the trial court's exer-
cise of sound discretion. (3) Denial of a motion for waiver would
be based on sound discretion where "the court was not satisfied
that the application was defendant's informed and intelligent
act."'12  (4) Denial would not be a sound exercise of discretion
where defendant demonstrated prejudicial pretrial publicity or
that the conduct of his defense would be inhibited by the
presence of a jury,13 or where denial was based merely on the
trial court's desire to avoid deciding a disagreeable case.14
For the most part, the opinion in Kilburn simply reiterated
these points and applied them to the facts of the case:
[N]o evidence was produced that passions were aroused or that
any prejudice would result to deny the availability of impar-
tial jurors.... There was no showing of pretrial publicity or
prejudice, and, as indicated by defense counsel, no showing of
prejudice during the trial or by the jury's actions. The court
was not trying to avoid a disagreeable case, as indicated above
by . . . denial of the motion [on the ground that defendant's
interests would best be served by a jury trial].15
The waiver provisions of rule 26 can be read as incorporating
the rules enunciated in Gaulke and Kilburn. There are two such
provisions, one general and one specific, applicable only to cases
involving claims of prejudicial pretrial publicity. The former
provision simply provides that a defendant who has been advised
of his right to a jury trial and had an opportunity to consult
with counsel may, with the approval of the court, waive jury
versy, but a jury trial may be waived by the parties in all cases
in the manner prescribed by law....
The court in Gaulke concluded, in effect, that section 631.01 prescribes
the manner for waiver without abrogating the case-law rule that waiver
is conditional upon approval of the court.
In denying an absolute right to waiver, the Minnesota court is in
accord with the majority of state courts. There are, however, three
different forms of conditional waiver: 1) Minnesota and 17 other states
require the consent of the court; 2) 11 require the consent of the
prosecution; 3) nine states follow FED. R. Cam. P. 23 (a), which requires
the consent of both the court and the prosecution. Only six states hold
that waiver is a right of the defendant. Six states do not allow waiver
under any circumstances. See Note, Constitutional Law: Criminal Pro-
cedure: Waiver of Jury Trial: Singer v. United States, 51 CoRNEI-I L.Q.
339, 342-44 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Waiver of Jury Trial]; Annot.,
51 A.L.R.2d 1346 (1957).
12. 289 Minn. at 360, 184 N.W.2d at 602.
13. In Gaulke defendant had asserted that his trial counsel, who
had died by the time of the appeal, "conducted only perfunctory cross-
examination of the young [rape] victim and the state's medical witness
because 'we didn't dare to put any pressure on the girl because we would
get the jury against us if we did."' Id.
14. Id. at 360-61, 184 N.W.2d at 603.
15. 231 N.W.2d at 65.
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trial "in writing or orally upon the record in open court."'" The
latter provision, in contrast, grants an absolute right to a know-
ing and voluntary waiver where "there is reason to believe that,
as the result of the dissemination of potentially prejudicial ma-
terial, the waiver is required to assure the likelihood of a fair
trial."17
This latter provision, like its analogue in Kilburn's and
Gaulke,'9 is designed to safeguard the defendant's right to
a fair trial. In Singer v. United States,20 the United States
Supreme Court, though rejecting the assertion that due process
and the right to a fair trial create a general, unconditional right
to waiver of a jury trial,2' intimated that there might be cir-
cumstances where denial of defendant's request for waiver would
deprive him of his right to a fair trial:
Petitioner argues that there might arise situations where "pas-
sion, prejudice . . . public feeling" or some other factor may
render impossible or unlikely an impartial trial by jury. How-
ever, since petitioner gave no reason for wanting to forgo jury
trial other than to save time, this is not such a case .... 22
This same concern for fairness underlies the Minnesota court's
position in Gaulke, Kilburn, and the new rule 2 3 that the right
to waiver is absolute where there is a showing of prejudicial pre-
trial publicity.
It will be observed, however, that Kilburn and Gaulke
further suggest that denial of a request for waiver might be an
16. The defendant, with the approval of the court may waivejury trial provided he does so personally in writing or orally
upon the record in open court, after being advised by the court
of his right to trial by jury and after having had an opportunity
to consult with counsel.
MumN. R. CPlm. P. 26.01(1) (2) (a).
17. The defendant shall be permitted to waive jury trial when-
ever it is determined that (a) the waiver has been knowingly
and voluntarily made, and (b) there is reason to believe that,
as the result of the dissemination of potentially prejudicial ma-
terial, the waiver is required to assure the likelihood of a fair
trial.
Id. 26.01 (1) (2) (b).
18. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
19. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
20. 380 U.S. 24 (1964).
21. A defendant's only constitutional right concerning the
method of trial is to an impartial trial by jury. We find no con-
stitutional impediment to conditioning a waiver of this right on
the consent of the prosecuting attorney and the trial judge[as is done by FED. R. CPnW. P. 211 (a)] when, if either refuses
to consent, the result is simply... an impartial trial by jury.
Id. at 36.
22. Id. at 37-38.
23. See notes 18-19 supra and accompanying text.
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abuse of the trial court's discretion-that is, the right to waiver
might be absolute-where jury prejudice is due to factors other
than pretrial publicity, such as inherent racial bias.24  Obvi-
ously, a fair trial is as much denied by jury prejudice resulting
from inherent racial bias as by jury prejudice resulting from pre-
judicial pretrial publicity.25 As is indicated below, 26 whether the
new rule grants an absolute right to waiver where jury preju-
dice is due to factors other than pretrial publicity depends on
how the general provision of the rule is interpreted.
If the court chose to do so, it could easily interpret the new
waiver provisions consistently with the reasoning of the Kilburn
decision. Applied to Kilburn itself, for instance, such an inter-
pretation would lead to the conclusion that because Kilburn
made "no showing of pretrial publicity or prejudice,"27 he had
no right to waiver under the second of the two provisions; and
because the trial judge denied Kilburn's motion on the rationale
that jury trial would be in Kilburn's best interests,2 8 he did
not abuse the discretion vested in him, consistently with prior
case law, by the first provision. Indeed it seems likely that this is
precisely how the court will interpret the new provisions if
it adheres to the views espoused by the three justices who joined
in the opinion of the court in Kilburn. However, as indicated
above,29 it is equally likely that a majority of the court will
reject those views and accept those of the dissenters. And, as
the remainder of this discussion endeavors to demonstrate, the
latter result would be preferable.
The argument in favor of the Kilburn dissent proceeds from
several basic premises. First, the state has little, if any, legiti-
mate interest in requiring jury trial of a criminal defendant who
24. See text accompanying notes 13 and 15 supra. The refusal of
the Kilburn court to conclude that, given the facts of the case and the
overwhelmingly white population of the county of the crime and trial,
the mere fact of the defendant's race was sufficient evidence of the like-
lihood of a prejudiced jury is criticized in text accompanying notes 53-
57 infra, in the context of a discussion of the proper interpretation of
the new waiver provisions.
25. The opinion in Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1964), sug-
gests as much. It speaks generally of the possibility that "'passion,
prejudice... public feeling' or some other factor may render impossible
or unlikely an impartial trial by jury." Id. at 37-38; see text accompany-
ing note 22 supra.
26. See text accompanying notes 56-60 infra.
27. State v. Kilburn, 231 N.W. 61, 65 (Minn. 1975); see text accom-
panying note 15 supra.
28. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
29. See note 6 supra, and text accompanying notes 6-8,
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knowingly chooses a court trial.30 Second, as the Supreme Court
has said, "trial by jury has its weaknesses and the potential for
misuse."31 Third, these weaknesses and possible abuses are not
necessarily removed by the devices traditionally available for
that purpose: voir dire,32 change of venue,33 and continuance of
trial.84 Recognition of these premises would seem to logically
lead to the conclusion that the criminal defendant should always
have an unconditional right to waive jury trial. Although that
conclusion has been rejected as a general constitutional proposi-
tion by the Supreme Court 35 and by most state supreme courts
under their constitutions,3 6 the persuasive logic underlying it
30. See State v. Spegal, 5 III. 2d 211, 125 N.E.2d 468 (1955); Don-
nelly, The Defendant's Right to Waive Jury Trial in Criminal Cases, 9
U. FLA. L. REV. 247, 248 (1956).
31. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 35 (1964). The most obvi-
ous weakness is that relevant in the present context: jury prejudice,
whether as a result of pretrial publicity or general community attitudes.
32. The success of voir dire depends upon the existence of a panel
containing a high proportion of unprejudiced prospective jurors, from
which the defense, with its limited number of challenges, can ferret out
the few prejudiced members. If most or all of the panel members are
prejudiced, voir dire becomes inadequate. See Note, The Right to an
Impartial Federal Jury in the Event of Prejudicial Pretrial Publicity, 53
CoLU v. L. REv. 651, 654-55 (1953). Moreover, voir dire can never be
effective unless the defense can perform the difficult task of detecting
concealed or unconscious bias. See id. See also Sue, Smith, & Gilbert,
Biasing Effects of Pretrial Publicity on Judicial Decisions, 2 J. CanM.
JUSTiCE 163, 164 (1974); Note, Selection of Jurors by Voir Dire Examina-
tion and Challenge, 58 YALE L.J. 638 (1949).
33. Obviously, change of venue does not protect the defendant when
there is no alternative place of trial where the jurors are less likely to
be prejudiced than those in the original. forum. Limitation of alternative
venues to the state in which prosecution began and the pervasiveness
of the modern mass media tend to increase the frequency of such situa-
tions. The problem is greatly exacerbated where the source of the preju-
dice is, for practical purposes, intrinsic to the case-as in Kilburn, where
the black defendant had admitted the sexually related homicide of a
white girl in an almost all white county of an overwhelmingly white
state.
34. Continuance does not solve the problem of jury prejudice
caused by the circumstances of the case. See note 33 supra.
The basic inadequacy of voir dire, change of venue, and contin-
uances to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial is aggravated
by the fact that, because the trial judge is supposed to be in a
uniquely favorable position to assess the attitudes of potential jurors,
Note, The Right to an Impartial Federal Jury in the Event of Preju-
dicial Pretrial Publicity, 53 Co.vu-. L. REV. 651, 655 n.19 (1953),
appellate courts are reluctant to reverse denials of motions for these de-
vices. See, e.g., State v. Krampotich, 282 Minn. 182, 163 N.W.2d 772
(1968); State v. Ellis, 271 Minn. 345, 136 N.W.2d 384 (1965). Indeed,
Kilburn itself is exemplary of such deference to the trial judge.
35. See notes 20-22 supra and accompanying text,
36. See note 11 supra,
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should nonetheless inform judicial interpretation of the rules,
either statutory or common-law, that regulate waiver of jury
trial. It is, after all, somewhat ironic that the right to jury
trial5 7-the hard-won right to be judged by one's peers and, ul-
timately, by their moral standards rather than by an officer of
the state sworn to apply its laws-should become a yoke that
the defendant can remove only with the state's permission. 8
The decision in Kilburn, and thus one possible interpretation
of the new rule,88 attributes too little importance to these prem-
ises. In the first place, it operates on the assumption that the
state has an interest in requiring a jury trial. Paradoxically,
that interest is that jury trial is in the defendant's "best inter-
est."40 It was with a view to "the [best] interest of the Defend-
ant" that the trial court in Kilburn denied the motion for
waiver;41 and it was that ground for denial that the supreme
court approved as indicating that the trial court was not merely
avoiding decision of a disagreeable case.42
Neither the trial court nor the supreme court indicated why
a jury trial was in defendant's best interest; given the circum-
stances of the case, their conclusion seems dubious,48 unless
one assumes that defendants are always better off being
tried by a jury. However, even where there are plausible
grounds for concluding that a jury trial would aid a defendant,
it is improper for a court to deny a motion for waiver on that
37. Article 1, section 6 of the Minnesota Constitution guarantees the
right to jury trial "in all criminal prosecutions." The term "all criminal
prosecutions" includes prosecutions for all "crime," which is defined by
MINNESOTA STATUTES § 609.02(l) to mean "conduct ... prohibited by
statute and for which the actor may be sentenced to imprisonment with
or without a fine." Peterson v. Peterson, 278 Minn. 275, 153 N.W.2d 825
(1967); State v. Ketterer, 248 Minn. 173, 79 N.W.2d 136 (1956). The de-
fendant's right to jury trial for offenses punishable by more than six-
months' imprisonment is also guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth
amendments to the federal Constitution. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S.
66 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
38. See Hall, Has the State a Right to Trial by Jury in Criminal
Cases?, 18 A.B.A.J. 226, 227 (1932). The few references to jury trial at
the constitutional convention were general statements that the right was
intended to protect the accused from government oppression. 3 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENON OF 1787, 101, 221-22 (M. Farrand
ed. 1911).
39. See notes 27-28 supra and accompanying text.
40. See notes 41-42 infra and accompanying text.
41. State v. Kilburn, 231 N.W.2d 61, 63 (Minn. 1975).
42. Id. at 65; see text accompanying note 15 supra.
43. See text accompanying notes 53-56 infra.
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basis.44 The decision whether a waiver is advisable is a matter
of strategy, and as such it should rest exclusively in the hands
of the defendant and his attorney.45
In Minnesota, the notion that defendant's best interests may
be served by compelling him to undergo jury trial developed cir-
cuitously. The trial judge's conclusion in Kilburn to that effect
was inspired by language in an earlier Minnesota supreme court
decision, State v. Boyce.4 6 In that case the high court, reviewing
a conviction following an error-free court trial, remanded on the
ground that the record raised grave doubt as to defendant's guilt.
In so doing, the court suggested that the defendant would be
wise to accept a jury trial on remand.47 The reason for the
suggestion-which was only that--was the court's concern that
in a second court trial the judge might "suffer from a subcon-
scious reluctance to . . . second-guess [the] colleague" who had
first tried the case.48
The advice in Boyce was based on a plausible concern, yet
it was not couched as a directive to the trial court to deny a
waiver motion; indeed the fact tha; the court offered the advice
implied that the trial court might well grant such a motion. In
Kilburn, however, the trial judge concluded, without explana-
tion, that "[i] n line with States versus Boyce I'm inclined to agree
with the County attorney that in this situation I think the inter-
est of the Defendant would best be served by a jury trial. ' 40
And the supreme court approved his denial on that ground.50
So by this curiously circuitous route, the supreme court's well-
considered advice to one defendant that he accept a jury trial
became general authority for a trial court, aided by the prose-
cuting attorney, to reject a defendant's strategy and substitute
its own on his behalf. If Kilburn is followed in interpreting the
44. See State v. Kilburn, 231 N.W.2d 61, 67 (1975) (Otis, J., dissent-
ing).
45. Id.; see ABA CoDE oF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIIzY EC 7-7
(1975).
46. 284 Minn. 242, 170 N.W.2d 104 (1969).
47. Id. at 261, 170 N.W.2d at 116.
48. State v. Kilburn, 231 N.W.2d 61, 68 (Minn. 1975) (Otis, J., dis-
senting).
49. Id. at 63 (majority opinion). Presumably the judge did not
mean that he himself might be subconsciously prejudiced against the
defendant. Thus the statement must be taken to mean that the judge
understood Boyce to gay either that jury trials are generally in the de-
fendant's best interests, or that the trial judge ought in each case to de-
termine which type of trial would best serve the defendant.
50. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
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new rules regarding waiver,51 such action by a trial judge will
stand unless it can be shown that he or she ignored evidence
demonstrating pretrial dissemination of material potentially
prejudicial to the defendant.5 2
In the Kilburn case itself, the untoward effects of making
the trial court the arbiter of the defendant's trial strategy were
exacerbated, because the trial judge failed to attribute any merit
to the defendant's convincing assertion that because of his color,
the facts of the case, and the overwhelmingly white composition
of the local population, his right to an impartial trial was jeopard-
ized absent a waiver. As one of the dissenting supreme court
justices observed:
This is a classic case where ... prejudice against a defend-
ant, whatever his race, color, or ethnic background, is inevitable.
The killing of a 15-year-old white girl by an adult black in the
course of a sexual encounter is the most inflammatory and vola-
tile set of circumstances imaginable .... In all of Anoka
County, the record indicates there are only a handful of blacks.53
Under these circumstances, surely the justice was correct in
concluding that "[i]n the absence of the court's articulating any
purpose for a jury trial other than his belief 'that the Supreme
Court feels the interests of the Defendant are best served by
a trial to a jury,' . . it was the court's duty to try the matter
without a jury. ' 54  Yet the opinion for the court, though not
attempting to contradict the dissenter's characterization of the
circumstances, affirmed the trial court's action on the ground,
among others,55 "that no evidence was produced that passions
were aroused or that any prejudice would result to deny the
availability of impartial jurors."5 6
One must question whether this demand for more evidence
of prejudice than is inherent in the facts of the case and the
racial composition of the community is realistic, and whether
such a standard adequately safeguards the defendant's right to a
fair trial. It is true that not all whites would be prejudiced
against a black who had confessed to sexually assaulting and kill-
51. That is, if the views of the three justices who joined in the opin-
ion for the court are followed. See note 6 supra.
52. See MmN. R. CPam. P. 26.01(1) (2) (b), quoted in note 17 supra.
53. 231 N.W.2d at 69 (Otis, J., dissenting). The views of this dis-
sent are further elaborated in note 58 infra.
54. 231 N.W.2d at 69 (Otis, J., dissenting).
55. Other grounds were the absence of prejudicial pretrial publicity
and the fact that the trial judge thought he was acting in the defendant's
best interests. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
56. 231 N.W.2d at 65; text accompanying note 15 supra.
19761
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ing an innocent white girl. But given the substantial likelihood
that many in any white community would be, the virtual impos-
sibility of proving who or how numerous they would be, and
the lack of any apparent state interest in requiring a defendant to
be tried by a possibly prejudiced jury, is it not an unnecessary
reduction of the likelihood of a fair trial to deny the accused's
motion for waiver on the ground that he hasn't adequately
proved prejudice?
In terms of its relationship to the waiver provisions of the
new rules, the preceding analysis of the court's decision in Kil-
burn concerns only the general provision allowing waiver with
the court's approval.57 The analysis indicates that the interpreta-
tion of that provision foreshadowed by the court's approach to
Kilburn is improper. It usurps the defendant's right to conduct
his own defense with the assistance of counsel; it fails to ensure
that the judge's decision as to the form of trial will be in the
defendant's best interests; and in. some cases it imperils the
defendant's right to a fair trial. 'What is required, then, is an
interpretation of the general waiver provision that does not
recognize a state interest in determining the defendant's best
interests regarding the form of trial, that presumes that the
defendant's opinion as to the dictates of those interests is correct,
and that provides for meaningful appellate review of whatever
other state interests a trial court offers to support a denial
of a motion for waiver. Such an interpretation might be phrased
as follows:
The trial judge should grant any knowing and voluntary motion
for waiver unless he can advance sound countervailing reasons
for not doing so; the judge must not usurp the defendant's right
to conduct his own defense with the assistance of counsel.
This suggested interpretation would seem to be implicit in the
opinions of the two dissenting and the one concurring justice
in Kilburn,5 s and thus of half of the justices who considered
57. Alm. R. CRnw. P. 26.01 (1) (2) (a), quoted in note 16 supra.
58. 231 N.W.2d at 66-67 (MacLaughlin, J., concurring); id. at 67-
71 (Otis, J., dissenting); id. at 71 (Rogosheske, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Otis wrote an extended dissenting opinion with which Justices Mac-
Laughlin and Rogosheske expressed general agreement. Judge Otis ar-
gued that the case involved "the most inflammatory and volatile set of
circumstances imaginable," 231 N.W.2d at 69; text accompanying note
53 supra, and that those circumstances would render jury prejudice "in-
evitable." He concluded that the trial court's refusal to grant waiver,
without offering any compelling reasons for a court trial, was therefore
an abuse of discretion. He did not suggest any reasons that might sup-
port a denial of waiver, nor did Justice MacLaughlin or Justice Rogo-
[Vol. 60:759
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the case.59 Moreover, such an interpretation has been applied
by the New York Court of Appeals to a statutory provision
similar to section 631.01.60
It should be observed that none of the Minnesota or New
York judges sharing this viewpoint has suggested an example
of a legitimate state interest that a trial court might offer in
support of a denial of a motion for waiver. This is not surprising,
for apart from distrust of its own judges the state has no
apparent interest in requiring a defendant to stand a jury trial.
And distrust of judges while it may be cause for finding better
ones is not a persuasive reason for denial of waiver. Thus, if the
suggested interpretation is followed, proper trial court denials
will be rare or nonexistent under the new Minnesota waiver pro-
visions. This result would be consistent with the principle that
the right to jury trial is intended to protect the defendant's inter-
ests in our system of justice.0 1 Moreover, it would safeguard
sheske. Justice Otis did state that in determining that defendant's "best
interests" required a jury trial, the court "was preempting the exclusive
function of a defense counsel in advising what trial tactics would be
most beneficial to defendant." 231 N.W.2d at 67; see note 44 supra and
accompanying text. Justice Otis did not explicitly assert, but did inti-
mate, that defendant's right to a fair trial had been violated. After initi-
ally stating that there were "compelling reasons" why -the trial court
should have decided defendant's guilt or innocence without a jury, 231
N.W.2d at 67, he later quoted the following passage from the Supreme
Court's opinion in Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 37 (1964):
[T]here might be some circumstances where a defendant's rea-
sons for wanting to be tried by a judge alone are so compelling
that the Government's insistence on trial by jury would result
in the denial to a defendant of an impartial trial.
231 N.W.2d at 70. For a discussion of Singer, see text accompanying notes
20-22 supra.
Although Justice Otis did not express any general view on the
proper standard to govern trial court rulings on motions for waiver, the
reasoning of his opinion supports the interpretation of the general waiver
provision of the new rule suggested here.
59. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
60. People ex rel. Rohrlich v. Follette, 20 N.Y.2d 297, 229 N.E.2d
419, 282 N.Y.S.2d 729 (1967). The court stated:
[T]he requirement of judicial approval is designed to insure that
the defendant's waiver is a knowing and intelligent one and that
the discretion of the Trial Judge to deny a defendant's request
to waive a jury trial is limited to those cases in which some
"compelling ground arising out of the attainment of the ends ofjustice" requires that the request be denied.
Id. at 300-01, 229 N.E.2d at 421, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 731-32. The court did
not suggest any reasons that might compel a denial of defendant's re-
quest. See also People v. Spegal, 5 Ill. 2d 211, 221, 125 N.E.2d 468, 473
(1955).
61. See -M'xN. R. Cerrm. P. 26.01(1) (2) (a), Comments; ABA STAND-




the defendant's right to a fair trial in those cases, such as Kil-
burn, where jury prejudice due to factors other than pretrial
publicity is an obvious possibility, but incapable of demonstration
by ordinary means of proof.
The second provision of the waiver rule reflects recog-
nition, based on the decision of the United States Supreme Court
in Singer v. United States,62 that where prejudicial pretrial
publicity precludes selection of an impartial jury, denial of a
motion for waiver would deprive defendant of his right to a fair
trial.63 This provision will, of course, be of importance only if
the interpretation of the general provision offered above is not
adopted -and the rule of Kilburn prevails instead.0 4 If Kilburn
prevails, the crucial question in applying the prejudicial publicity
provision will be how, as a practical matter, to demonstrate to
the court that "there is reason to believe that, as a result of the
dissemination of potentially prejudicial material, the waiver is
required to assure the likelihood of a fair trial.
'65
At the outset, it should be noted that this provision does
not require any "reason to believe" that the "dissemination" of
"material" has actually had a prejudicial effect in the commu-
nity. The wisdom of the rule is its recognition that such an effect
is extremely difficult to document, and that the defendant's
interests are adequately protected only if it is assumed that
the dissemination of prejudicial raaterial does in fact create
prejudice.6 6
The language of the provision certainly suggests that the evi-
dence of prejudicial pretrial publicity need not be strong in order
to create an absolute right to waiver. "Reason to believe" is
a very lenient standard for judicial decisionmaking, and the other
crucial terms, "potentially" and "likelihood," are consistent with
such a standard. Moreover, since the state has little, if any, in-
terest in requiring a jury trial,67 the burden of proof on the
defendant as to the degree or likelihood of existing or potential
prejudice should not be great.
62. 380 U.S. 24 (1964).
63. See notes 18-23 supra and accompanying text.
64. See notes 15 and 24 supra and accompanying text.
65. MINN. R. Clnv. P. 26.01(1) (2) (b).
66. An analogous recognition should have led the Kilburn court to
hold that, given the "inflammatory and volatile set of circumstances" in-
volved in the case, 231 N.W.2d at 69 (Otig, J., dissenting), the defendant's
motion for a waiver of jury trial should have been granted. See text
accompanying notes 56-57 supra.
67. See text accompanying notes 60-.61 supra.
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For these reasons, the absolute right to waiver created by
the new rule should be found whenever the defendant has
produced-or the trial judge has otherwise become aware of
-evidence of generally publicized material that might, given
the character of the community and the circumstances of the
case, prejudice potential members of a jury.
Because there was no evidence in Kilburn of pretrial
publicity prejudicial to the defendant, the court did not have to
consider the amount of such evidence necessary to support a right
to waiver. Therefore, the Kilburn decision poses no obstacle to
an appropriate interpretation of the second provision of the
waiver rule.
In sum, the new Minnesota rule regarding waiver of jury
trial by a criminal defendant has, in effect, received two opposing
interpretations in State v. Kilburn. Kilburn suggests that if the
views of the three justices who prevailed in that case are sup-
ported by at least two of the justices who did not participate
in the decision, the provision of the rule that generally subjects
waivers to the approval of the trial court will be read to grant
the trial court broad discretion to deny a motion for waiver on
the ground that jury trial would be in the best interests of the
defendant, except where the motion is based on allegations of
prejudicial pretrial publicity. As the dissenters and one of the
concurring justices in Kilburn recognized, however, this interpre-
tation allows the trial court to usurp the defendant's right to
determine a crucial aspect of the conduct of his own defense,
and exacerbates this problem by failing to provide a check on the
soundness of the judge's determination of what the defendant's
interests require. Moreover, where the potential for jury preju-
dice inheres in the very circumstances of the case, as in Kilburn,
this interpretation may impair the defendant's right to a fair
trial. A better interpretation would require the trial court to
grant a motion for waiver if it could not support a denial with
cogent reasons other than its understanding of the dictates of the
defendant's interests. This approach would respect the defend-
ant's right to conduct his own defense with the assistance of
counsel, recognize that the right to jury trial exists for the de-
fendant's benefit-not the state's, and preserve the defendant's
right to a fair trial. If the dissenters' views are adopted by two
undecided justices, this latter approach will prevail.
Because there was no evidence of prejudicial pretrial
publicity in Kilburn, the decision casts little light on how the
Minnesota court will interpret the second, special provision of
19761
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the new rule. If the view of the dissent prevails as to the proper
interpretation of the general provision, the prejudicial pretrial
publicity provision will be of minor importance. If the view of
the majority prevails as to the general provision, it will be
important to determine how much evidence of prejudicial pre-
trial publicity the defendant must produce in order to gain an
absolute right to waiver. In either case, the answer should be
that very little is required, for, again, the state has little or no
interest in trying defendants before a jury, and the likelihood
that defendants will receive a fair trial is reduced by any amount
of potentially prejudicial publicity.
